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Abstract
We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention
for a risky venture. A natural monopoly is regulated i) for economic purposes; ii) because it
can cause losses of substantial size to third parties (the environment or people). The regulator
observes the production cost without being able to distinguish the initial type (an adverse
selection parameter) from the effort (a moral hazard variable). In addition, the investment in
prevention is non observable (another moral hazard variable) and the monopoly is protected
by limited liability. We fully characterize the optimal regulation in this context of asymmetric
information plus limited liability. We show that incentives to reduce cost and to invest in safety
are always compatible. But, in some cases, higher rents have to be given up by the regulator.
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1 Introduction
We study the design of a suitable public policy for managing industrial and environmental acci-
dents such as oil spills, nuclear accidents, fires, explosions or air/soil/water contamination. The
major wave of health, safety and environmental regulation that began in the 1970s, with the pi-
oneering role of the United States, led to the enactment of new regulatory agencies with broad
responsibilities for risk and environmental policy (see Viscusi, 2007). However, there are many
drawbacks for any efficient public intervention. These include asymmetric information between
public authorities and potential polluters regarding relevant parameters such as the scale of po-
tential harm, the probability of an accident, the cost of prevention, the firm’s assets level. In the
case of regulated sectors, private information on firms’ efficiency – which interferes with any eco-
nomic regulation – can add to the private information on environmental parameters. Moreover,
firms are protected by limited liability. Different sources of inefficiencymay thus be compounded.
The objective of this paper is to better understand the optimal public policy toward a firm in such
contexts. In particular, firms may face an internal conflict between cost minimization and pre-
vention. How should public authorities tackle such a conflict? We provide a normative analysis
to answer this question. We describe the optimal regulation of a risky venture that benefits from
private information both on efficiency and safety care that in addition is protected by limited
liability.
Consider a natural monopoly that undertakes some socially valuable activity but can poten-
tially cause an accident affecting third parties, the environment or people’s health or private prop-
erty. This monopoly can take actions to reduce the expected losses: it can invest to reduce the
probability of accidents, such investment in prevention being costly. This monopoly is already
regulated for economic purposes.1 The regulation is introduced under asymmetric information
regarding some relevant variables. More specifically, we assume that the regulator observes the
production cost of the monopoly, but cannot distinguish the monopoly’s type (an adverse selec-
tion parameter) from the monopoly’s effort toward cost reduction (a moral hazard variable). As
already said, the monopoly can also invest in prevention.2 It is assumed that both types of invest-
ment or effort interact through a disutility function: the two levels of effort are not independent.
1Regulatory efforts induce a greater focus on cost minimization and are thus sometimes considered as a shortcut
for competition discipline.
2From an Incentive Theory viewpoint, we study a mixed model of adverse selection followed by moral hazard
together with limited liability. See Ollier and Thomas (2013).
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The externality between the natural monopoly and third parties calls for public intervention.
We assume that both the economic and the environmental regulations are designed by the same
Agency.3 Hence, the Agency elaborates a regulatory contract with one eye on cost reduction and
another on prevention. The Agency implements an incentive regulation that induces safety care
and revelation about its type by the monopoly.
We first characterize the social optimum. We then proceed step by step to characterize the
optimal regulation. Let us start with the case where the monopoly has unlimited liability.
In a first benchmark, everything is observable except the prevention effort. In this setting
where the monopoly’s efficiency is common knowledge and there is no limited liability, moral
hazard on safety care is easily solved by the regulator. Since the monopoly can be punished in
the event of accident – it is just asked to cover the losses – then incentives are given at no cost (the
monopoly ends up with zero rent) to induce the first-best allocation.
In a second benchmark, the level of safety care remains unobservable. The novelty is that the
monopoly is protected by limited liability: it cannot end up with a negative payoff, even when
it is held responsible for an accident. Giving incentives for safety to the monopoly allows it to
obtain an ex ante positive expected profit designated as a limited liability rent (Laffont-Martimort,
2002, chapter 4). Distortions on cost reducing effort are thus introduced to limit this rent.
The most complex case comes when the regulator is unable to observe the monopoly’s effi-
ciency characteristic. It is shown that, in order to induce revelation of the cost, it is sometimes
necessary to give up some informational rent to the monopoly. But, due to limited liability, the
monopoly is also able to extract some limited liability rent. There is therefore a subtle combi-
nation of both types of rents at the optimal regulation. We explore their respective roles in detail
and show that three distinct cases arise depending onwhether the limited liability rent is constant,
increases or decreases with the level of cost reducing effort.
In the first case, the limited liability rent is constant. The optimal contract is a standard one
with the usual adverse selection trade-off between efficiency and informational rent extraction.
The limited liability rent plays no role in this tradeoff.
In the second case, where the limited liability rent is decreasing with the cost reducing effort,
only the least efficient type of monopoly obtains a limited liability rent. All the other types receive
an informational rent and a limited liability rent, both decreasing with the type. These rents being
3We abstract here from the multi-Principals setting: therefore no conflict arises from different Principals with
different objectives regulating the same Agent.
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costly, distortions - in opposite directions - are introduced on cost reducing effort. We show that
the priority for the regulator is to reduce the limited liability rent rather than the informational
rent. For all types, the third-best level of cost reducing effort is strictly larger than first-best and
some pooling on cost over the whole distribution of types is optimal.
In the third case, where the limited liability rent is increasing with the cost reducing effort, we
show that no informational rent is given up to the monopoly, whatever its type. All types receive
a limited liability rent: the latter is decreasing with the type and ensures revelation. Indeed, by its
level and its slope, the limited liability rent plays all roles at the same time: allowing participation,
giving incentives for prevention together with inducing revelation of the type. The third-best level
of cost reducing effort is now strictly lower than first-best.
As a summary, we have shown that incentives to reduce cost and incentives to invest in safety
care are compatible. But, in some circumstances, the optimal contract is more costly from a social
viewpoint: in this case, higher rents have to be given up.
This article belongs to the Principal-Agent literature with a risky regulated firm. In this line
of research,4 Hiriart and Martimort (2006b) characterize the optimal regulation of a firm under
adverse selection on efficiency and moral hazard on safety care. The main difference is that the
production and prevention costs are independent in their setting. The fact that the two effort
levels interact through the disutility function in the present context renders the analysis much
more complex. This interaction is the building block of Laffont (1995) who first investigated the
potential conflict between cost minimization and prevention. His intuition is that regulatory ef-
forts or simple competition, by inducing a greater focus on cost minimization, can tilt the Agent’s
tradeoff towards taking too much risk. His main conclusion is that high-powered incentives may
conflict with safety care: fewer incentives should be given for cost minimization in order to in-
duce prevention at a lesser cost for the regulator. In a discrete model with both the adverse
selection parameter and the moral hazard variable being binary, the firm’s optimal contract is
conjectured for two polar cases.5 The main intuitions are provided on the mechanisms at work in
the intermediary cases but there is no sketch of the optimal contract except for the two polar cases
above-mentioned.
4See Pitchford (1995), Boyer and Laffont (1997), Balkenborg (2001), Newman and Wright (1990), or Hiriart and
Martimort (2006a), though all these papers study essentially the case of extended liability.
5The probability of avoiding an accident when not taking care i) approaches zero, ii) approaches the probability
of accident when taking care. Only asymptotic results are obtained in this complex setting.
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Our model essentially elaborates on that paper. We extend that pioneering model by con-
sidering a continuous case for the firm’s adverse selection type - but safety care remains binary.
Furthermore, the two types of effort are not perfect substitutes as assumed in Laffont (1995).
Following his strategy, we restrict attention to the case where the highest level of prevention is
implemented, which amounts to assuming that potential losses are large compared with preven-
tion cost. We characterize the optimal regulation for all possible cases, thereby solving a problem
left open until now. This provides more general results and allows us to show precisely that no
conflict arises between cost minimization and prevention. In the process, we have shown the cru-
cial role played by the limited liability rent, and particularly its evolution with the monopoly’s
cost reducing effort, in determining the optimal policy.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives some bench-
marks of increasing complexity. Section 4 describes the optimal contract when all possible con-
straints are taken into account. Section 5 briefly concludes by pointing out opportunities for
further work.
2 The Model
We consider a natural monopoly that undertakes some risky activities and is subject to some
incentive regulation. This activity is socially valuable and consumers derive a gross surplus S
from it. With a probability 1   p an accident occurs and creates external losses of a given size D.
We restrict our attention to unilateral accidents: victims have no means of reducing the expected
losses, they play a passive role. In addition, there is no possible contractual or market relationship
between the monopoly and potential victims, meaning that employees or consumers of the firm’s
products are excluded from our analysis.
The monopoly. Let us denote by U the monopoly’s expected profit. The monopoly receives a
transfer t from the rest of society for its activity. It bears a production cost C =     e, where
  2 B = [ ,  ] captures the firm’s efficiency characteristic and e    measures its cost reducing
effort. The monopoly pays an amount f in the event of accident, that can be interpreted as a
regulatory fine or liability payment. The total transfer t + C allows the monopoly to cover its
total cost, meaning production cost, C, plus liability payment, f , in the event of harm. By abuse
of terminology, the probability p 2 {p0, p1} with 1 > p1 > p0 > 0, of avoiding the accident is
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considered as a prevention effort.6
Last, the monopoly incurs a non-monetary disutility  (e, pi).7 For the sake of simplicity,
let  i(e) =  (e, pi), i = 0, 1. We formulate the usual assumptions in regulatory settings: the
marginal disutility of cost reducing effort is positive, increasing and convex, i.e.  0i(e) > 0, 00i (e) >
0, 000i (e)   0, i = 0, 1. However, we consider that the disutility also satisfies a series of additional
conditions.
Assumption 1 8e 2 [0,  ],

























From i), the marginal disutility of safety effort p is positive. Moreover, the marginal disutility
of cost reducing effort increases with the level of safety effort. In that sense, both efforts are
complements.8 Finally, the safety effort p also increases the convexity of the disutility with respect
to the cost reducing effort e. Point ii) says that the average disutility of safety effort is increasing
in p. Point iii) assumes super-modularity (resp. sub-modularity) of the average disutility of safety
effort when its variation increases (resp. decreases) with the cost reducing effort. Point iv) implies
that super- or sub-modularity is increasing in e.
The monopoly’s expected profit writes as:
Ui = t  (1  pi)f    i(e). (1)
Regulator’s objective. Following Laffont and Tirole (1993), we assume that there exists a positive
marginal cost of public funds   > 0. The rest of society’s expected welfare V writes as:
Vi = S   (1  pi)D   (1 +  ) (t+ C   (1  pi)f) .
6Implicit is the assumption that the monopoly invests in prevention, and a level of safety care transforms into a
probability of avoiding an accident. It is necessary to invest in safety to increase the probability p. Since investment
is costly, then an increase in the probability p is costly. In addition, investment is assumed unobservable. Thus, p is a
moral hazard variable.
7See multitask literature with Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), or Laffont and Tirole (1993), chapter 4.
8Laffont (1995) had restricted attention to the case where both efforts were perfect substitutes with  i(e) =  (e+
pi). We obtain our results without that very specific assumption.
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Social welfare simply aggregates the firm’s expected profit and the rest of society’s expected
welfare: Wi = Ui + Vi. Replacing inWi the expected transfers t   (1   pi)f by their expression as
a function of the firm’s rent Ui, the regulator’s objective function writes as:
Wi = S   (1  pi)D   (1 +  )(C +  i(e))   Ui. (2)
This expression shows that the monopoly’s expected rent is costly for the regulator. The latter
will try to reduce it as much as possible.
Information structure. The monopoly is privately informed about its efficiency parameter before
the regulation contract is signed. Once the contract is signed, the monopoly exercises two levels
of effort (cost reducing effort and safety care) that are non verifiable by the rest of society. The
regulator observes the total production cost C but is unable to distinguish   and e. This regulator
has beliefs about the distribution of the efficiency characteristic   with density function g(.) and
cumulative G(.). We make the following assumption.






In other words, the distribution satisfies the monotonicity of hazard rate property.9
3 Benchmarks
3.1 Social Optimum
Let us start by characterizing the first-best allocation. For this purpose, we assume that the effi-
ciency characteristic   is observable and the prevention effort (p here) is verifiable. In addition,
we assume that there is no limited liability: the monopoly can end up with a negative payoff.
The regulator’s problem is to determine the triplet {Ui, e, pi} of rent and efforts that maxi-
mizes the expected social welfare Wi under the constraint that the monopoly participates. The
participation constraint is such that:
Ui   0, i = 0, 1. (PC)
Let us denote the first-best solution by superscript FB.
No rent is left to the monopoly, since the objective function (2) is decreasing with Ui. Hence,
UFBi = 0, i = 0, 1.
9Most of the usual distributions satisfy this property, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
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As in Laffont (1995), we confine our attention to the case where the highest level of prevention
is socially optimal. This is true if and only if, for a given level of effort e, the expected social
welfare at p1 is larger than at p0. The conditionW1   W0 rewrites as:
(1 +  ) ( 1(e)   0(e))  (p1   p0)D. (3)
This condition says that the highest level of care is optimal if the increase in prevention cost from
 0(e) to  1(e) (taking into account the marginal cost of public funds) is smaller than the reduction
in expected harm due to the reduction in the probability of accident from 1   p0 to 1   p1. It is
satisfied for large losses. In the following, we assume that the regulator implements this safety
effort.
The necessary condition for maximizingW1 with respect to the cost reducing effort gives 1 =
 01(e
FB). The socially optimal level of effort equates the marginal social (and private) cost of effort
with its marginal social benefit, equal to one. Indeed, one unit of effort directly reduces the total
cost of production by one.
In this restricted setting, the optimal regulation is:8>>>><>>>>:





Before diving into the full-fledged model developed in Section 4, let us first consider inter-
mediate settings where one-dimensional asymmetric information, then limited liability, put con-
straints on the definition of the optimal regulation. We proceed step by step through benchmarks
of increasing complexity.
3.2 Benchmark 1. Moral hazard on safety care
In this first benchmark, we keep the same information structure as in the first-best, except that the
prevention effort p is no longer observable. There is still no limited liability constraint.
Choice of safety care by the firm. The safety care p1 is implemented if the expected profit U1 is
larger than U0:
p1 = arg max
pi2{p0,p1}
Ui , t  (1  p1)f    1(e)   t  (1  p0)f    0(e),
, f    1(e)   0(e)
p1   p0 > 0.
10 (ICp)
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This condition says that the monopoly chooses the highest prevention effort if the increase
in prevention cost from  0(e) to  1(e) is smaller than the reduction in the expected fine due to
the reduction in the probability of an accident from 1   p0 to 1   p1. Since it is unobservable,
the prevention effort cannot be imposed by the regulator on the firm. The moral hazard incentive
constraint (ICp) should thus be taken into account whenever trying to define an optimal incentive
regulation. The participation constraint remains (PC).
The regulator’s problem. The regulator needs to determine the monopoly’s rent and the level
of cost reducing effort that maximize the expected social welfare (2) under the participation con-
straint (PC), given the moral hazard incentive constraint (ICp):8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
max
{U1,e}
W1 = S   (1  p1)D   (1 +  ) (    e+  1(e))   U1,
s.t. U1   0,
with f    1(e)   0(e)
p1   p0 .
The solution is exactly the socially optimal one given by (FB). As long as the firm’s expected profit
can be reduced to zero, moral hazard on safety care can be solved at no cost for the regulator: the
optimal regulation remains the first-best. Comparing (3) and (ICp), it can be implemented by a
policy f = D
1+ 
which aligns private and social incentives to exercise care. The monopoly may end
up with a negative payoff in the event of accident (recall that it is not protected by limited liability
in this benchmark). Participation is ensured as long as the expected profit remains positive. This
constraint is satisfied since UFB1 = 0.
Let us now investigate how the optimal regulation is modified when the monopoly is pro-
tected by limited liability.
3.3 Benchmark 2. Moral hazard on safety care and limited liability
The problem faced by the regulator is essentially the same as Benchmark 1, except that the
monopoly is protected by limited liability. Thismeans that, in the event of accident, themonopoly’s
payoff cannot be negative. This constraint writes as:
t  f   0. (LLC)
10The last inequality follows from Assumption 1, point i).
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Using (ICp) and (1), it can be rewritten as:
U1   R1(e) = p1f    1(e), (4)
where R1(e) is the limited liability rent of the monopoly. Since U1 is socially costly and R1(e)
increasing with the fine f , the latter will be reduced to its minimumwhile satisfying (ICp). Hence
we have f =  1(e)  0(e)
p1 p0 , and R1(e) = p1
 1(e)  0(e)
p1 p0    1(e). We restrict our attention to the relevant
cases whereR1(e) is positive.11
Since a gap between the payoffs obtained in the two states of nature (accident/no accident)
must be created in order to give incentives for safety care provision,12 and given that themonopoly
cannot be punished in the event of accident (due to limited liability), then the monopoly is able to
extract a positive rent. As a consequence, (4) implies (PC), ensuring participation of themonopoly.
At this point, it is interesting to see how the rent evolves with respect to the cost reducing
effort e. The expression of R01(e) = p1  
0
1(e)  00(e)
p1 p0    01(e) does not allow us to come to a definite
conclusion on its sign. Hence we have three cases. First, whenR01(e) = 0, the limited liability rent
is constant. Second, whenR01(e) < 0, the limited liability rent is strictly decreasing with the effort
e.13 This implies that the higher the effort one wants to induce, the lower the level of the limited
liability rent that must be given up to the monopoly. The reverse happens whenR01(e) > 0.14
The regulator’s problem. The regulator needs to determine the monopoly’s rent and the level




W1 = S   (1  p1)D   (1 +  ) (    e+  1(e))   U1,
s.t. U1   R1(e).
Let us denote the second-best optimal solution by superscript SB. The limited liability con-
straint is binding: USB1 = R1(eSB). The optimal cost reducing effort is such that:









Let us now compare the second-best cost reducing effort level obtained in (5) with the first-
best level characterized by (FB). Due to limited liability, rents can no longer be reduced to zero.
Three cases arise.
11This is verified with the help of Assumption 1, point ii).
12The gap is here created by inflicting the fine f in the event of accident.
13This is due to sub-modularity. See Assumption 1, point iii).
14This comes from super-modularity. See Assumption 1, point iii).
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When the limited liability rent is constant with respect to the cost reducing effort, the optimal
effort is the first-best level: eSB = eFB.
When the limited liability rent is decreasing with the cost reducing effort, an upward distor-
tion on eSB is introduced with respect to the first-best level. The second-best level of effort still
equalizes its marginal social benefit with its marginal social cost. But, the cost reducing effort
reduces the limited liability rent: there is a marginal social benefit associated with an increase in
effort e. Hence, the marginal social cost of increasing e is  01(e) and the marginal social benefit is
1    
1+ 
R01(e). A higher level of effort e allows the Principal to reduce both the production cost
of the monopoly and the limited liability rent that must be given up to it. Indeed, this is a quite
comfortable situation for the regulator: there is no conflict between his own objectives.
By contrast, when the limited liability rent is increasing with the cost reducing effort level and
since this rent is socially costly, a downward distortion on eSB is introduced with respect to the
first-best level. The second-best level of effort equalizes the marginal social benefit, equal to 1,
with the marginal social cost: the marginal social cost of the rent, namely  
1+ 
R01(e), now adds to
 01(e).
The existence of these three cases is highly structuring for the resolution of the full-fledged
model developed in the following section.
4 Optimal Regulation under Limited liability
Let us nowmove to the case where the monopoly’s efficiency characteristic   is not observable by
the regulator. The latter only observes the production cost C. The unobservability of the type  
leads to a loss of control over the cost reducing effort e. This private information on the cost side
adds to the non-verifiability of the prevention effort level. In addition, the monopoly is protected
by limited liability.
We focus on direct revelation mechanisms where the monopoly reports  ˆ on its type and this
report is truthful:  ˆ =  . From the Revelation Principle,15 there is no loss of generality in con-
sidering such direct and truthful mechanisms that define transfers, production costs and finesn
t( ˆ), C( ˆ), f( ˆ)
o
contingent on the report  ˆ made by the monopoly on its type. The expected
15See Myerson (1982).
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profit U1( ˆ,  ) of the monopoly when claiming  ˆ when its true type is indeed   writes as:





Choice of prevention effort by the monopoly. The moral hazard incentive constraint (ICp) be-
comes:
f( ˆ)    1(e( ˆ))   0(e( ˆ))
p1   p0 . (7)
Choice of the report  ˆ by the monopoly. Incentive constraints require that, 8 ,  ˆ 2 B:
U1( ) = U1( ,  )   U1( ˆ,  ). (IC )
That is, the report  ˆ =   maximizes the monopoly’s expected profit U1( ˆ,  ).
Lemma 1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for truth-telling on its type by the monopoly write as:16
U 01( ) =   01(e( )) < 0, (8)
e0( )  1 , C 0( )   0. (9)
Except for the least efficient one, all types have an incentive to overstate their cost, but none has
any incentives to understate it. The condition (8) says that, to induce revelation, more efficient
types should receive higher rents. In addition, from (9), the production cost should be weakly
increasing with the type.
Limited liability. We finally get to the problem at stake where all possible constraints are taken
into account. Since it is protected by limited liability, the monopoly’s payoff in the event of acci-
dent cannot be negative. The constraint (LLC) becomes:
t( )  f( )   0, 8  2 B. (10)
From Benchmark 2, we know that the compounding of limited liability and moral hazard al-
lows the monopoly to extract a limited liability rent R1(e( )). To implement the pair of effort
levels (e( ), p1), the regulator must ensure that the monopoly’s expected profit satisfies the con-
dition:
U1( )   R1(e( )) = p1f( )   1(e( )), 8  2 B,
16See the proof in Appendix A.
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where U1( )   R1(e( )) comes from (4). By analogy with Benchmark 2, the moral hazard incen-
tive constraint (7) is binding, and thus
U1( )   R1(e( )) = p1 1(e( ))   0(e( ))
p1   p0    1(e( )), 8  2 B.
Optimal Regulation. To determine the optimal regulation, it is useful to decompose the overall
expected rent, U1( ), received by the monopoly into a limited liability component, R1(e( )), and
an informational component I1( ) such that:
I1( ) = U1( ) R1(e( )), 8  2 B. (11)
The slope of I1( ) is crucial to determine the optimal regulation. Indeed, differentiating (11),
we get:
I 01( ) =   01(e( )) 
✓
p1
 01(e( ))   00(e( ))





So, whenR01(e( )) = 0, the informational rent is strictly decreasing. Moreover, whenR01(e( )) <
0, the sufficient condition (9), e0( )  1, implies that I 01( ) < 0.17 By contrast, ifR01(e( )) > 0, then
I 01( ) can have, a priori, any sign. As indicated in Benchmark 2, three cases arise depending on
the sign ofR01(e( )).
Let us denote the optimal solutions by superscript ⇤. We first analyze the case where the
limited liability rent is constant, then decreasing, and finally increasing with the cost reducing
effort.
4.1 Constant limited liability rent
Proposition 2 (Laffont, 1995). WhenR01(e( )) = 0, the optimal contract is such that:18
i) The informational rent is decreasing and I⇤1 ( ) = 0. All types receive a limited liability rent
R1(e⇤( )), which is constant.
ii) There is full separation on production cost C. The cost reducing effort e⇤( ) satisfies:





















Thus, the left-hand side is greater than 1. Since, from (9), the right-hand side is lower than 1, we are sure that
I 01( ) < 0whenR01(e( )) < 0.
18The proof is omitted since we are in a pure case of adverse selection, with the usual trade-off between efficiency
and rent extraction, not affected by the limited liability rent since it is constant. The latter amounts to a better outside
opportunity when it comes to participation.
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iii) The optimal level of cost reducing effort is lower than first best (8  2 B, e⇤( )  eFB, with equality
holding at  ) and thus, the optimal level of fine is also lower than first best (8  2 B, f ⇤( )  fFB,
with equality holding at  ).
We obtain here the usual tradeoff between extraction of the informational rent and efficiency,
reflected by the second term on the right-hand side of (13). An informational rent is necessary to
induce truthful revelation on the type by the monopoly. However, this rent is increasing in the
cost reducing effort. Since it is socially costly to give up any rent from the regulator’s viewpoint, a
downward distortion of effort e is introduced to limit the informational rent. The monopoly also
obtains a positive limited liability rent: the latter being constant with respect to the type  , it does
not play any role in the tradeoff depicted above.
Let us now move to the cases where R01(e( )) 6= 0. These cases have not been studied yet,
though they are of the utmost interest in determining the optimal contract, due to the possible
interplay between the limited liability rent and the informational rent.
4.2 Decreasing limited liability rent
Proposition 3 WhenR01(e( )) < 0, the optimal contract is such that:19
i) The informational rent is decreasing with the monopoly’s type   and I⇤1 ( ) = 0. All types of the
monopoly receive a limited liability rent, which is also decreasing.


















R01(  + k⇤). (14)
iii) The optimal level of cost reducing effort is strictly larger than first best (8  2 B, e⇤( ) > eFB) and
thus, the optimal level of fine is also strictly larger than first best (8  2 B, f ⇤( ) > fFB).
Interpretation. We need to keep in mind that rents are socially costly, hence they will be reduced
to their minimum except if some positive level is required for incentive reasons.
First, as Lemma 1 shows, notice that no type of the monopoly has incentives to mimic a more
efficient one. Obviously, there exist incentives to mimic less efficient types. Let us start by the
19See the proof in Appendix B.
20Pooling on production cost C implies that e0( ) = 1, hence the form of the solution e⇤( ) =   + k⇤.
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least efficient type of the monopoly,  ¯. There is no need to give any informational rent to it, since
it cannot mimic any type. Type  ¯ just receives the limited liability rent. All the other types of the
monopoly are able to extract some positive informational rent in addition to the limited liability
rent. Since both rents are costly, the regulator seeks to limit them. This is done by introducing two
types of distortion on the third-best level of cost reducing effort, reflecting two different trade-offs
between efficiency and rent extraction.
The trade-off between efficiency and extraction of the informational rent is reflected in the
second term between brackets on the right-hand side of (14). Since the informational rent is in-
creasing in the effort e, the cost of the former pushes toward a downward distortion on effort.
The trade-off between efficiency and extraction of the limited liability rent is reflected by the
existence of the last term on the right-hand side of (14). Since the limited liability rent is decreasing
in the effort e, this pushes toward an upward distortion on effort.
Hence, summarizing, there are two forces at play. The first one pushes the third-best level of
effort to be lower than first-best except for   since G( ) = 0; the second one pushes the third-
best level of effort to be larger for   =  ¯. Equivalently, C⇤( ) > CFB( ), 8  <  ¯ and C⇤( ¯) <
CFB( ¯). This suggests a reduction in production cost at  ¯. But such a reduction is constrained by
(9). The result is some pooling on the upper part of the interval of types B. Appendix B shows
that the second effect dominates: pooling is optimally extended to all types of the monopoly. In
other words, the priority for the regulator is to reduce the limited liability rent rather than the
informational rent.
For the same argument, the third-best level of effort is strictly larger than first-best. Since
C 0( ) = 0, e0⇤( ) = 1 and the distortion is strictly increasing with the type. The moral hazard
incentive constraint (7) indicates a one-to-one mapping between fine and effort. Thus, (14) also
defines the third-best level of fine f ⇤( ) =  1(e
⇤( ))  0(e⇤( ))
p1 p0 .
4.3 Increasing limited liability rent
Let us now move to the case where the limited liability rent is increasing with the cost reducing
effort.
Proposition 4 WhenR01(e( )) > 0, the optimal contract is such that:21
21See the proof in Appendix C.
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i) No informational rent is given up to the monopoly: I1( ) = 0, 8  2 B. All types of the monopoly
receive a limited liability rent, which is decreasing.













iii) The optimal level of effort is strictly lower than first best (8  2 B, e⇤( ) < eFB) and thus, the optimal
level of fine is strictly lower than first best (8  2 B, f ⇤( ) < fFB).
Interpretation. As indicated earlier in the comments following (12), when R01(e) > 0, the slope
of the informational rent can have, a priori, any sign. In particular, this slope can be zero. Since
rents are costly, a solution where none of the monopoly’s types receives an informational rent is
optimal. However, all types of the monopoly receive a limited liability rent. Hence, (15) describes
a trade-off between efficiency in cost reducing effort and extraction of the limited liability rent,
as in Benchmark 2. This trade-off is however modified with respect to the standard case of pure
moral hazard since it is constrained by setting the informational rent I1( ) at zero, implying that
e⇤( ) =  ( ) + k⇤ 6= eSB( ). Contrary to Proposition 2, the limited liability rent is now increasing
with the cost reducing effort e. This now leads to a downward distortion of effort and fine for the
whole distribution of types.
Coming back to (11), since I 01( ) = 0 then the limited liability rent has the same slope as U( ).
The latter is negative, hence the limited liability rent is strictly decreasing with the type.
4.4 Discussion
We will now comment briefly on the optimal third-best policy described in this section.
Comparison with a Pigovian policy. One may wonder how this third-best optimal policy is linked to
the level of harm. A quick look at the benchmarks allows us to better understand this relationship.
It should be noticed that in Benchmark 1, where safety care is not observable but the firm can be
punished since not protected by limited liability, the optimal policy remains first-best: private and
social objectives are aligned by imposing a fine equal to the level of harm - taking into account
the cost of public funds - i.e. f = D
1+ 
. Moral hazard on prevention solely does not impede a
Pigovian policy. Whenever the firm can no longer be punished - it cannot end up with a negative
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payoff - then the optimal fine departs from the level of harm because of limited liability rent. This
can be seen in Benchmark 2. The results would be different if the firm had some assets to start
with. If it were rich enough, then there would be no distortion of the policy and it would pay
D
1+ 
in the event of accident. The distortion is introduced by the fact that the firm is unable to
cover the losses in the event of accident. Then, in order to provide incentives for prevention while
ensuring participation, the limited liability rentRmust be given up to the monopoly. The fine f is
still equal to  1(e)  0(e)
p1 p0 . However, the distortion introduced on e
SB because of the limited liability
rent creates a distortion on f : the optimal second-best fine is necessarily linked to the level of the
limited liability rent. Hence, when frictions are introduced in the setting, the fine goes beyond the
harm level and is affected by the rents that are necessary for incentive and participation purposes.
This is even more the case when, in addition to moral hazard on prevention and limited liability,
we also consider the non-observability of the cost  , as in Section 4. Then, for the same arguments,
the fine f in this third-best setting is still affected by the rents that must be given up to the firm.
When the limited liability rent is decreasing, an informational rent adds to a limited liability rent:
these two rents pooled together increase the gap between the optimal fine and the level of harm.
When the limited liability rent is increasing, the gap comes from keeping the informational rent
at zero.
Comparison with Laffont (1995). Let us now try to locate our results with respect to those obtained
in Laffont (1995). We have already seen that our Proposition 2 brings us back to a result in that
reference paper. We obtain it when the limited liability rent is constant, whereas Laffont (1995)
obtains it when p0 ! 0 (using ourmodel variables), i.e. when the probability of having an accident
when not taking care tends toward one. All types of the monopoly receive an informational rent
with the usual tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction. However, there is no mention of
the limited liability rent in Laffont (1995) concerning this case and our main contribution is to
uncover the essential role played by this rent in determining the optimal policy.
As soon as R01(e( )) 6= 0, we obtain a regulatory policy which is absent in Laffont (1995).
Provided that Assumption 1, point ii) is satisfied, all types receive a limited liability rent. Then,
specific properties of the average disutility  
p
determine whether the optimal contract is the one









> 0, the limited liability rent is decreasing with the cost reducing effort e: a de-
creasing limited liability rent adds to a decreasing informational rent, there is pooling on the pro-
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0, no informational rent is necessary to elicit private information: the level and slope of the lim-
ited liability rent are sufficient to ensure participation and revelation of the type and there is a
downward distortion on effort e. These striking results are completely new.
Overall, we have shown that there is no incompatibility between cost minimization and pre-
vention, as long as the necessary rents are provided to the monopoly. However, there is a cost
for this regulatory policy, due to these rents, since regulatory transfers have to be left to the firm.
Then, if the rents necessary to implement the third-best policies described earlier were too costly,
the regulator would give up implementing efforts for cost minimization. We would be back to
e = 0, the corner solution obtained in Laffont (1995) when p0 approaches p1, corresponding to
a situation where the probability of accident when not taking care approaches the probability of
accident when taking care.
5 Conclusion
This paper is a follow-up to Laffont (1995). Generalizing the model to a continuous case for
the adverse selection parameter on efficiency and the moral hazard variables on cost reducing
effort, we have characterized the optimal incentive regulation for a whole range of cases that had
not been explored by that author. Investigating the possible conflict between incentives for cost
minimization and for prevention in the case of a natural monopoly, we have obtained many new
results. In particular, we have shown that the optimal regulatory contract is strongly driven by
the limited liability rent obtained in this setting by the monopoly.
Following Laffont (1995)’s pioneering work, we have restricted attention to regulations imple-
menting the highest level of safety care, a policy which is socially optimal as long as we deal with
high levels of environmental losses, let us say disasters. Revelation of the cost by the monopoly
is always possible, and the third-best level of cost reducing effort can be higher or lower than
first-best. However, once again, there is a cost for this regulatory policy, a dimension which has
been left aside in the present analysis. A first natural extension of our work would be to go a step
further and explore the optimal regulation for a lower range of possible environmental damages,
in which case it would not be necessarily optimal to induce the highest level of prevention. This
is kept for further research.
In our paper, the monopoly is regulated both for economic and environmental purposes. To
17
better understand the possible conflict between cost minimization and prevention, we have pro-
vided a normative analysis where a single regulator is in charge of both types of regulations. In
real life, two different entities are usually in charge of these different tasks. Accordingly the po-
tential conflict could be affected and possibly made worse. A second natural extension of this
work is to move to a multi-Principals setting in which an economic regulator and a separate
environmental one both control the same risky natural monopoly. This is also kept for further
research.
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Appendix
Appendix A. First and second-order conditions are respectively:
@U1
@ ˆ
( ,  ) = 0, (16)
@2U1
@ ˆ2
( ,  )  0. (17)
Using (7) and (6), first-order condition (16) is equivalent to:
t0( )  (1  p1)f 0( ) +  01(e( ))C 0( ) = 0. (18)
Since U1( ) = U1( ,  ), we use the Envelope Theorem to understand how it evolves with the










( ,  ) =   01(e( )) < 0.
Differentiating (16), we obtain @
2U1
@ ˆ2
( ,  ) + @
2U1
@  ˆ
( ,  ) = 0. So, from (18), the second-order
condition (17) can be rewritten as:
 001(e( ))C
0( )   0. (19)
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But, with  001 > 0 and C 0( ) = 1  e0( ), we get e0( )  1.
Let us show that this local condition is also globally sufficient. Revelation is globally optimal
if, 8 ,  ˆ 2 B, U1( ,  )   U1( ˆ,  ). This is equivalent to:Z  
 ˆ
(t0(b)  (1  p1)f 0(b) +  01(    C(b))C 0(b))db   0.
Using (18), we get: Z  
 ˆ




C 0(b)( 01(    C(b))   01(b  C(b)))db   0.
Since  001(e) > 0, we have  01(  C(b))  01(b C(b)) > 0, 8b <  . So C 0( )   0 is also sufficient
for revelation.
Appendix B.
⇤ Proof of Proposition 3 i). Since I 01( ) < 0 when R01(e( )) < 0 and rents are costly from the regu-
lator’s viewpoint, then the type  ¯ will not receive any informational rent at the optimal solution,
i.e. I1( ¯) = 0, U1( ¯) = R1(e( ¯)).
⇤ Proof of Proposition 3 ii). The monopoly’s expected profit is strictly decreasing with the type  .




 01(e( ˜))d ˜ + U1( ¯).
From the last expression, we can write the expected profit on the whole distribution of typesR












 01(e( ))G( )d  + U1( ¯). (20)
Using i), U1( ¯) = R1(e( ¯)). The regulator’s objective writes as:Z
B
⇣





g( )d     R1(e( ¯)). (21)
This takes into account the informational rent received by all types of the monopoly except type
 ¯, and the limited liability rentR1(e( ¯)) = p1  1(e( ¯))  0(e( ¯))p1 p0    1(e( ¯)) received by the worst type
  =  ¯. The constraint faced by the regulator is e0( )  1.
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From now on, argument of functions will be omitted unless necessary. Using optimal con-
trol techniques with scrap value, we let C 0 = y, where C is a state variable and y is a control









Denoting by ⌘ the multiplier of constraint y   0, the Lagrangian writes:
L = H + ⌘y.
There are two necessary conditions for maximization:
Ly = µ+ ⌘ = 0, (22)
µ0 =  HC =  
✓





There are also two transversality conditions. The first at   writes as:22
µ( ) = 0. (24)
The second one at  ¯ writes as:
µ( ¯) =  R01( ¯   C( ¯)). (25)
There is a slackness condition:
⌘   0, ⌘y = 0. (26)
Since the Lagrangian is linear in y, necessary and transversality conditions are also sufficient
if H and   R1 are concave in C. The first sufficient condition is HCC < 0, which amounts to⇣
 (1 +  ) 001     0001 Gg
⌘
g < 0. The assumptions  001 > 0 and  0001 > 0 ensure that the last condition is




p1 p0    001
⌘
 0. It is satisfied using
Assumption 1, point iv).
Now, let us show the optimality of a pooling contract.
Combining (22) and (26), we have:
⌘ =  µ   0. (27)
Our demonstration proceeds in four steps. Each step is a statement for which proof is given
directly below.
22Transversality conditions in similar optimization problems with scrap value function can be found in Seierstad
and Sydsæter (1987), Theorem 3 page 182.
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a) There exists    <   such that C 0 = 0 for       .
SinceR01(e( ¯)) < 0, from (25), we have µ( ¯) < 0. By continuity of the costate variable µ and
(24), there exists    such that: 8><>:
µ = 0 if      ,
µ < 0 if   >   .
(28)
Using (27), this implies that: 8><>:
⌘ = 0 if      ,
⌘ > 0 if   >   .
(29)
Hence, using (26), we obtain y = 0 ) C 0 = 0 for   >   . Moreover, by continuity of C, we
must have, using (9):
C( ) = C(  ) for any       . (30)
b) We have: C 0 > 0 for   <   .
From (28), we have µ = 0 on [ ,   ]. Therefore, µ0 = 0 on [ ,   [. From (23) and (27), it
follows that C is such that:
























Therefore, C 0 = 1  e0 > 0 on [ ,   [.
c) We have: ⌘0 > 0 if   >   .
Using (27), ⌘0 > 0 is equivalent to µ0 < 0. Assume that the statement c) does not hold:
hence, there exists some  ˜ >    such that µ0( ˜) = 0. By continuity of C, C(  ) is given by
(31). Moreover, if  ˜ >   , we know, from (30), that C( ˜) = C(  ). But if, by assumption,
µ0( ˜) = 0, then C( ˜) is the solution of (31). Then using the same argument developed for
statement b), we must have C( ˜) > C(  ). This is a contradiction. Therefore, ⌘0 > 0 on
]  ,  ¯].
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d) We have:    =  .
The general idea of the proof is the following. There cannot be    >   satisfying the conti-
nuity of µ, and, using (27), the continuity of ⌘. Using (25) and (27), we have ⌘( )
  
C=C(  ) =





=  R001( ¯   C(  ))   0. (32)
Moreover, using (23) and (27):
⌘0|C=C(  ) = HC |C=C(  ) .
By concavity of the Hamiltonian, this yields:
@ ⌘0|C=C(  )
@C(  )
= HCC |C=C(  ) < 0. (33)
Assume the existence of a    >  . From b), we know that C(  ) > C( ). This implies
0 < ⌘0|C=C(  ) < ⌘0|C=C( ) from c) and (33). Moreover, the interval over which ⌘ is strictly
positivemoves on the right. Since the slope is lower, then by continuity of ⌘, the path must
end at a lower level: ⌘( )|C=C(  ) < ⌘( )|C=C( ). A contradiction with (32). Hence,    =  .
Using a), the cost C is constant over the whole interval: a pooling contract is optimal.
⇤ Proof of Proposition 3 iii). From the proof of (c) above, we know that ⌘0 > 0, 8  2 B. In particular,
we have ⌘0( ) > 0. Using (23), (27) and G( ) = 0, we get ⌘0( ) > 0 ,  01 > 1 at  . We also know
that e0⇤ = 1 since C 0⇤ = 0 (from the proof of ii)). So, from equation (FB), we obtain e⇤ > eFB, for all
  in B, since 1 = e0⇤ > e0 FB = 0.
Appendix C.
⇤ Proof of Proposition 4 i).
a) Assume that I1( ) is increasing over [ ,  +✏[with  ¯   > ✏ > 0. The best type only getsR1.
The transversality condition (27) becomes µ( ) =   R01 < 0. Using (30), this implies ⌘ > 0.










p1 p0 < 0. A contradictionwith the assumption that I1( ) is increasing.
b) Assume that I1( ) is decreasing on ]    ✏,  ] with  ¯     > ✏ > 0. The worst type only
gets R1. The transversality condition (28) implies that µ( ) > 0. This contradicts (30). As a
consequence, the informational rent cannot be decreasing over this interval.
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c) From the two preceding points, we conclude that: if the informational rent is positive over
some intervals of B, then the only possible shape for I1( ) is that it is first decreasing for
lower values of  , then it is flat for intermediary values and finally increasing for higher
values of  . Let us assume that I1( ) follows this pattern. Let us define the thresholds
( 1,  2) such that     1 <  2   ¯23 and, i) I1( ) is strictly decreasing on [ ,  1]; ii) I1( ) is
constant on [ 1,  2]; iii) I1( ) is strictly increasing on [ 2,  ].
In this case, the types belonging to [ 1,  2] do not receive any informational rent, since so-
cially costly: they will just receive the limited liability rentR1.
On [ ,  1], we find the same contradiction as in b): the informational rent cannot be decreas-
ing on [ ,  1]. This interval thus boils down to  1 =  . Similar reasoning applies for the
upper interval. On [ 2,  ], we find the same contradiction as in a): the informational rent
cannot be increasing over this interval. The latter degenerates and  2 =  ¯. As a conse-
quence, I1( ) = 0 on B: all types receive the limited liability rentR1.
23Obviously, the degenerated case   =  1 <  2 =  ¯ will not be considered.
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